175. Morality of causes
In
classical Greek philosophy it was assumed that knowing good automatically
produces doing good. Clearly that is not the case. Sociopaths know of good and
bad but don’t care, or even enjoy going against that knowledge. We often suffer
from weakness of the will: we know how we should act but are not motivated to
do so. And there may be other causes that enable or prevent moral conduct.
To proceed,
I make use of a multiple causality of actions, going back to Aristotle, that I
used before in this blog, in items 96-99. Multiple causes are tailored to human
conduct, with an efficient cause (the agent), a final cause (motives,
goals), a material cause (available material, means, resources), a formal
cause (method, skill, technology), a conditional cause (conditions
that ground, enable or disable, the other causes), and an exemplary cause
(a role model).
I now
propose that these different causes of conduct determine how morality affects
conduct, yielding a morality of causes. This, I propose, may help in the
practical implementation and adjudication of morality and in dealing with moral
complexity.
In the
preceding item in this blog I proposed that cultural principles are social,
cultural constructs that are not arbitrary but emerge from selection in the
evolution of societies. I now propose that moral principles yield the
conditional cause of moral conduct, which
also requires other causes.
Moral
principles are institutionalized in legal, educational, medical, and other
practices and standards. Together, they enable, constrain, and impel moral conduct.
They are external to the agent.
To have an
effect on conduct, moral principles must be supported by the motivating factor
of the final cause, goals and desires, internal to the agent. This includes
emotional drives of guilt, shame, and fear of social retribution. It also
includes a balancing of moral considerations and the flourishing of the agent’s
own life.
How this
works out depends on the efficient cause, i.e. the moral agent, with its
corresponding positions, roles and responsibilities. This may include features
of the networks in which agents are connected (such as structure of the network
and positions in it).
These
positional features of the agent determine the requirements and available
options for moral choice, with complexities of responsibility towards different
individuals and institutions, and the resulting moral dilemmas. A politician or
manager has to weigh individual and collective consequences of possible
actions. The collateral damage of bombing, for example. A parent has to include
responsibilities towards his/her children.
Next, moral
conduct is also affected by availability of the means needed for requisite
conduct, in the material cause, and requisite abilities and know-how, in the
formal cause.
The material and formal causes, and to some
extent also the positional features of the agent, are external to both the
agent and the moral principles.
The
material cause entails the materials for moral deliberation, such as relevant
logics, practices, literatures, precedents, cases, and illustrations.
The formal
cause entails knowledge and skill, in the ability to see events as morally
salient, to engage in moral conduct, and to argue in moral debate, given the
complexity and context-dependence of moral considerations. They yield the
ability of Aristotelian ‘practical wisdom’.
The
exemplary cause is the ‘moral hero’ who can manage the complexities of
Aristotelian virtue ethic well, in practical wisdom. This can be an exemplary
manager, politician, arbiter, judge, or author, for example. Moral decisions
vary with the context, and cannot be codified in universal protocols. The moral
choices of the hero cannot be copied from one situation to another, but
exemplary behaviour concerns the ways in which he/she goes about navigating moral
complexities.
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