176. Moral failure
The
multiple causality of moral conduct set out in the preceding item in this blog
can be employed to analyse moral failure.[i]
It can be
put together in the following scheme
material cause
> formal cause > final cause > moral action
perception moral ability > motivation || | |
context of action
Moral
failure can now be traced to lack in one or more of the causes.
First,
moral principles may be lacking. Second, one may fail to have the requisite
perception of a situation. Third, one may be unable to see its moral salience
in relation to the specific context of action, or one may be unable to conduct
the requisite action (for example inability to swim and make a rescue). Fourth,
there may be lack of motivation to act accordingly. One may disagree with the
moral principles (people ‘should be left to fend for themselves’), be weak in
will, be simply too lazy, give priority to self-interest (afraid to drown
oneself), or be confronted with conflicting duties (leaving an infant in hazard
on the embankment if one jumps in). The last depends on the position of the
agent and roles he has to play.
Moral role
models help to develop especially moral ability and motivation. Think of
parents, friends, teachers, sages, etc. Here literature may help, as an
exercise in moral judgement, as I argued in items 92 and 120 of this blog.
Take, for example, Ian McEwan’s latest book (The childrens act), in
which a judge is faced with a series of moral conflicts and paradoxes.
In tragedy,
the moral agent has a choice only between morally bad
options. The classic case is that of the Greek general Agamemnon who had to
choose between sacrificing his daughter or the army he led. As DeLapp pointed
out, here moral failure can be condoned, but it would be morally dubious if the
agent were not plagued by qualms of self-doubt or self-recrimination.
As DeLapp
also pointed out one may profit from a morally dubious situation without being
causally responsible for it. The example he uses is profiting from
discrimination (in getting a job, say), while disapproving of it. But the
question then is how much effort one is making to ‘change the system’.
In item 166
I discussed the issue of moral justification of harm that is foreseen but not
intended. Collateral damage of bombing, for example. I showed how this can be
approached distinguishing between guilt and punishment. To establish guilt one
should look at one’s responsibility as a cause of harm. For punishment, on the
other hand, mitigating circumstances are taken into account, such as the ones
discussed above, lack of ability, pressure of self-interest (e.g. survival),
conflicting obligations. Past conduct and expectations of future conduct also
matter. Did the culprit admit guilt, express regret, and was that credible in
view of past conduct?
What about
the conduct of bankers in the recent financial crises? They made profits while
hiving off risks of failure onto society. They claimed that they were not aware
of the risks of their conduct for society (material cause), or that their
conduct was dictated by the demands of capital markets or organizational
culture (conditional cause), or that they obeyed prevailing ethics in financial
markets (conditional cause), and were unable to escape from them (formal
cause), or were forced by the responsibilities of their positions (efficient
cause). Those arguments are either not credible or not adequate. They are
mostly excuses for masking the self-interest of profit, bonus or job (final
cause).
[i] As in the preceding item in this blog I
employ the moral issues raised by Kevin DeLapp, Moral realism, London:
Bloomsbury, 2013. However, my arguments and conclusions differ.
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