174. Moral realism?
A key question concerning claims of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, is ‘good or bad for what or whom?’ That in itself already entails that they are not ‘independent from us’.
Morality is
constructed in interaction between people. In Wittgenstein’s terminology: they
are part of language games. In that they are not purely subjective and
are largely social. The self needs debate with others, with different views, to
test its own moral views. But realism requires that morality is not up to us
even ‘if we all agree’. What, then, lies beyond language games, beyond tacit or
explicit social consensus? Is there any more ‘objective’ warrant?
I think
morality is also subject to an evolutionary selection mechanism as an external
cause. I am confident, but cannot be sure and cannot prove, that moral systems
that go against the flourishing of life and society will sooner or later fail
to survive, and will succumb in revolution or disintegration.
But what,
then, does flourishing of life and society entail, and how ‘given’ or
‘objective’ is that? Much more than in nature, in society the conditions that
constitute the evolutionary selection environment that determines the
survival or failure of morality are not fixed or given and are to a greater or
lesser extent affected by the morality they select. In other words, to some
extent there is co-evolution between society and its selection
conditions. To some extent societies create the survival conditions conducive
to them.
The
flourishing of life and society may come to mean submission to some
authoritarian regime. As I argued earlier in this blog, Fukuyama’s claim that
‘history has ended’ in the definitive victory of the liberal capitalist
democracy is not valid.
All this
makes my moral stance realist only in a limited sense. It is not the strong
realism that most moral realists like claim. My moral realism is also weaker
than my realism of knowledge of the natural world. There, the evolutionary
pressure of the laws of nature that constitute the selection environment of our
thought is more rigorous and more independent from our thought than in morality.
[i] For a recent discussion,
see Kevin DeLapp, Moral realism, London: Bloomsbury, 2013.
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