573. Poststructuralism

 One theme in Continental Philosophy is to militate against structures, of language and institutions, as Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida did, and Habermas to some extent. That is called ‘poststructuralism’ by some. In this blog, I do not oppose institutions, because societies cannot do without them. However, I am seeking a structure that leaves some room for freedom of individuals.

 Several philosophers militate against the loss of freedom due to state regulation and neglect of the individual (Nietzsche, Foucault, Habermas), and seek to escape the regimentation of structure. Michel Foucault reported on studies of prisons, clinics, science and sex as imposing discipline, embraced even by the victims of it. I consider myself a post-structuralist but that does not mean that I am against structure. Society, in particular, is a system with a structure of institutions and culture that is inevitable.

 A system by definition provides something that its elements do not, but to achieve this, the elements have to interact and surrender some of their autonomy. This is covered in the notion of ‘homeostasis’. That occurs in organisms, as in the human body and mind. In the body certain variables have to be kept within bounds of viability, such as salinity, temperature, blood, immunity. The mind also has homeostasis, in keeping within bounds emotions, reflexes, and reason.

 In the brain, only part is dedicated to reason, and the rest to emotions and reflexes, that are partly subconscious, in the stream of hormones and neuronal impulses. Like bodily homeostasis, both reason and emotions and reflexes developed in evolution because they contributed to survival and procreation, together with a language ability.

 Society imposes a host of regulations and other institutions. An institution is an ‘enabling constraint’. An example is a path through a swamp. Tou have stick to it or drown in the swamp, but it does get you across the swamp. However, the regulations have mushroomed into an ever more complex bureaucratic system, in what I call ‘institutional crowding’, because society has become ever more complex, increasingly add regulations that run into a wall of limited bureaucratic capacity, with only limited weeding out of defunct regulations.

Democratic governments interpret democracy as satisfying claims, and avoiding loss of votes to populist parties that make it their strategy to whip up complaints.

 I seek reduction, not abolishment of institutional structure; in what I would call a ‘porous’ structure that leaves fissures through which individuals can creep. This can be achieved not only by simplification and reduction of institutions, but also by the fact that language does not yield a closed regimentation. Ferdinand de Saussure distinguished ‘langue’, the synchronic, public, clear and reasonably consistent set of word meanings and their grammatical and syntactic order of concepts, and ‘parole’, the personal meanings associated with individual experience, diachronic, developing in time as personal identity unfolds, that can deviate from langue and infuses it with change. Parole is a compost from which a flower can bloom that now and then is added to the bouquet of langue.

 The point here is that in language there is room, in parole, for personal meaning that goes beyond the order of langue. The paradigmatic example is poetry, aided by metaphor, rhythm, rhyme and structure, but it may also arise in fictional narrative. Thus, there is some freedom of expression, ging beyond the structure of langue.

Habermas 1986, Autonomy and solidarity, interviews edited by P. Dews, Suhrkamp.

 Saussure, F de 1979, Cours de Linguistique Générale, Paris: Payotèque, Payot