527. Authenticity and conformity
I have had this debate on several occasions, with people in leading
positions, governing an employers’ association, a bank, and a research
association, who agreed with my objections but went ahead with neglecting them
and toeing the official line. Their argument was that they did object, to the
point of having to stop not to fall overboard and lose all influence. This
makes sense, though one can ask what the use of influence is if it requires
submission. But yes: When joining an organisation there must be commitment to
the organisational focus. The answer to the predicament is that it depends on
how fundamental the disagreement is, and when it is fundamental one can still
toe the official line and yet announce one’s disagreement publicly, for a wider
public, which in a democracy benefits from participation in the debate. One may
retort that this also makes one’s position untenable, but to me that is just
cowardice. I grant, however, that this is easy for me to say, in my position as
a free floating academic. And how to distinguish a bona fide whistle blower
from a cantankerous narcissist clamouring for attention? That can be done on
the basis of his arguments, submitted to a judicious forum. A ploy that is
often used is to continue with what someone disagrees with, but distract from
it with some more or less symbolic, token concession, such as a hospital or a
soccer stadium next to a polluting oil field.
In his studies of prisons, clinics, lunatic asylums and scientific
communities, Michel Foucault found that the institutions discipline inmates,
members or participants, to adopt, assimilate ideology, imposing an order of
conduct, to the point that those involved submit tacitly and voluntarily to the
imposed order, even if they are victims of the system. Earlier, I discussed the
notion of ‘organisational focus’, needed for people to achieve some joint
purpose. This conformity to institutions is inevitable, pervasive, ubiquitous,
also in schools, work places, parliament, families, even language, because a
person develops its identity in interaction with others. The perspective for
authenticity then seems scant. Foucault himself, in his latest work, could see
no way out, and got no further than exhorting people to create their lives as
‘works of art’ What does that mean? How to do that?
However, since Foucault conducted his studies, many institutions have
become more humane, in some countries, with new forms of management allowing
workers to enjoy the intrinsic value of work more, realising their potential.
Furthermore, apart from prisoners or patients in asylums, many people subject
themselves to not just one but a variety of institutions and activities, such
as jobs, professions, family, friends, church, sports, among which they can
‘divide and rule’, so to speak, compensating restrictions in one with more
freedom in another.
Being ‘true to oneself’ implies that there is a given self, but the self
is work in progress.
Kierkegaard saw three different levels of life: first,
hedonism, which he called ‘the aesthetics’, second ‘ethics’ as morality, the rules
and habits enshrined in society that one is expected to participate in, and
third, beyond that, ‘religion’, where one takes personal responsibility,
against the established rules if necessary. For Kierkegaard, at any moment one
has the freedom to make a commitment in the ongoing process of life in which
one discovers oneself and builds one’s identity. This is done in interaction
with others, and thus is inherently social. As Taylor said, the human being is
inherently dialogical ( Taylor 1989, Weir 2009).
This existential perspective of being not as a thing but as a process of
development was later also adopted by Heidegger (1993) with his notion of
‘Dasein’, where the subject is not pre-established outside the world but
participating and developing in it , and Sartre, with his injunction to grasp
the freedom of choice, in ‘good faith’, avoiding the ‘bad faith’ of just being
dragged along, but he was pessimistic of achieving this good faith. This notion
of life as a process is similar to the notion of ‘eudaimonia’, the good life,
in Aristotelian virtue ethics, which requires phronesis or ‘practical wisdom’, making judgements as a function of
circumstances, configuring and refining virtues, in the discovery and
development of oneself.
For Kierkegaard, this requires the transcendence of religion, the
unconditional surrender to and guidance by God. Levinas (1993) rejected that,
in view of the Nazi atrocities that the Nazi’s had inflicted on his family, and
considered belief in God and a hereafter as a redemption egotism. Instead, he proposed, demanded, an
unconditional surrender and commitment to the other human being, to the appeal
from his ‘visage’ as ‘the face of God’, thus remaining religiously inspired.
This view was also adopted by Derrida. (Keij 2015). This is a replacement of
vertical transcendence, to God, by horizontal transcendence, to the other human
being. One needs transcendence to something bigger and beyond the self to be
lifted above the mechanical following of rules of ethics.
One is always subject to conformity to the institutional orders one is
involved in, as indicated by Foucault, but this subjection is never seamless;
there are cracks through which authenticity can creep, and one can trade off
different institutions against each other. Here is the blessing of parole, that
can never completely be locked op in langue (de Saussure), the saying that goes
beyond the said (Levinas). There are rules of the game, but to some extent one
can choose the game, and follow the rules in one’s own style. In his late work,
Foucault developed something like this, in his attempt to create an authentic
life as a ‘work of art’.
Chinese philosophy differs from Western philosophy in that it is oriented towards the community, and the purpose of philosophy is to give guidance to conduct, while Western philosophy is oriented towards the autonomous individual seeking knowledge of the world. However, there is a distinction between Confucianism, which seeks conformance in following the rules and habits of that community, and Daoism that professes ‘wu-wei’, the rejection of fixed rules, in authentic, spontaneous flow along with the ongoing dynamic of the whole of nature (Dao). There, one falls back on the natural self, undistorted by the strictures of society.
Elsewhere (Nooteboom, 2021), I reconstructed identity
not as a thing we have, but as networks we are in,
with an individual seen as a node in various networks. As a person, one can be
positioned in different, partly overlapping networks at the same time,
connecting people with ties that are direct or indirect, via an intermediary
agent. Ties bear different forms of capital: economic, social, cognitive,
political and symbolic (as proposed by Pierre Bourdieu). Symbolic capital
includes norms and ethics of conduct, and their expression in symbols, myths, rituals,
canonical stories and histories, role models, proverbs and sayings. Personal
identity builds on the networks one is in, and thus one has a wider scope and
reach of identity to the extent that one is involved in more networks. Identity
shrinks when the subject is left outside the networks. The ties are cemented by
mutual dependence, concerning forms of capital The networks are related to
family, job, profession, religion, community and so on, and can cross national
borders.
In networks, the individuals need to have sufficient width and depth of
knowledge to yield the ‘absorptive capacity’ of dealing with other people at
some ‘cognitive distance’. It follows that the less education and experience
one has, the more difficult it is to profit from networks. Thus, some people
have less scope for authenticity than others, in a paucity of networks, and
this yields inequality.
Questions
-
Is authenticity naïve,
a dream
-
Do you see other
ways, not discussed, of balancing authenticity and conformity
-
Does your identity
have a constant essence, or is it in continuing development
No comments:
Post a Comment