430. Discussion and dialogue

David Bohm discussed the difference between discussion and dialogue.[i] In its etymology, dis-cussion is related to per-cussion and con-cussion: it entails a clash, here of views or standpoints that are defended. Dialogue, by contrast, is a flow of exchange between discussants, aimed at finding out the often tacit assumptions or judgements behind standpoints, in order to learn, to correct one’s prejudices by considering opposing or contrasting views. That connects with the perspective of interaction taken in this blog.

Here, I connect this with the view of identity or essence as a potential for development, discussed in foregoing items in this blog (item 419). This calls for attention not to what has been developed, in present opinions or views, but at opportunities for their change or further development. Dialogue helps in this, and in that sense one might say that dialogue is essential.

Earlier in this blog I argued that one needs opposition from others to have a chance of freeing oneself from preconceptions. Here I want to further deepen that.

In his book, Bohm argued that thought is reflexive, self-referential: if we think about our thought, that has the same source of preconceptions as the thought itself. We cannot think something and think about it objectively at the same time. One cannot think something and unthink it. Thought is self-confirming.   

This reminds me of Wittgenstein’s saying that it is odd to say ‘I think I have a pain’. Having a pain entails thinking one has it. One cannot have a belief and feel one does not have it.  

Bohm contrasts this with proprioception of the body. One can look at one’s hands, and see and feel them moving objectively. One can look in a mirror and observe oneself moving. We do not have such proprioception of thoughts and feelings. Bohm claims that one can learn to develop something like that, where one does not automatically give in the some emotion, and does not suppress it, which would only preserve it, but where one distances oneself from it, observing oneself coolly, and ‘setting it aside’: look at oneself having this thought/feeling.

This does not seem easy. And perhaps emotions need to be expressed in some way to escape from their grip. Ideas must be uttered and taken into action to reveal their limitations. That, I think, is the fundamental ground for pragmatism. And then, this possibility of a shout of ‘no’ (I derive this from the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard) from reality is enhanced, leveraged in opposition to an idea from someone else, who offers an alternative view or idea, and arguments for it.

‘Setting them aside’, those shouts of ‘no’, not acting on them, may rob one of the opposition from reality and the contrasting views of others that give an opportunity for correction.  

So, I fall back on the idea that we must appeal to someone else to look critically at what we say and feel, to break through the automatic self-justification of ideas, their self-referentiality. There lies the importance of dialogue.

An ideal dialogue is a coalition to mutually uncover the preconceptions, intentions, and needs that underly standpoints and views. That is needed to form a basis for empathy, knowing what makes others tick.  

That is needed to what earlier I called ‘crossing cognitive distance’. This is enabled by language, with metaphors to aid mutual understanding, but is also supported by one’s habitus, in facial expression and gestures, tone of voice, alternation between saying and listening.

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[i] David Bohm, 1996, On dialogue, Routledge