391. Ethics in
economics
Economists claim that
they do not make value judgements, but only indicate the economic consequences
of policy. But the theory they use does implicitly harbour an ethics, even
though many economists are not aware of it. Of what sort is that ethics?
There are several
systems of ethics. Liberalism, and with that economic science, rests on utility
ethics. That only looks at outcomes of choice and action, in this case utility,
in the form of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The ethical
quality of other considerations, such as honesty, justice, forbearance,
solidarity, etc. are irrelevant. ‘Greed is good’ as long as it leads to a
higher level of prosperity, and the equity of its distribution is less
relevant.
That stands in sharp
contrast with duty ethics (going back to the philosopher Kant), where the issue
is the ethical quality of motives of action, regardless of their consequences
in terms of utility. The claim is that moral rules are universal, valid under
all circumstances. The central principle is the ancient golden rule: One should (not) treat others as one would (not) want
to be treated oneself. Here, that became the categorical imperative: an act is good if you would want to raise
it to a universal rule. Lying is good if you would want everyone to do it. You
don’t want that, so you should never lie.
I don’t go along with that
because what is good or bad depends on circumstances. And what I find good for
myself is not necessarily good for another: needs and demands vary.
A third system is
virtue ethics, going back to the philosopher Aristotle. Virtues are character
traits, dispositions to conduct. Many virtues are eligible, depending on
circumstamces. The classical ‘cardinal’ (pivotal) virtues are: reasonableness,
courage, moderation, and justice. There is nothing wrong with pleasure, but it
should be in combination with moderation and justice. That is missing in
present theory and practice in economics.
Resistance is increasing
against the conduct of a number of large firms, such as banks and
pharmaceutical companies, those firms are suffering from it, and they come up
with plans for self-regulation. The key question is whether when push comes to shove
and this leads to less profit it will be accepted by shareholders.
For this I give an
anecdote. Two years ago I was asked by a colleague in Scotland if I would want
to take part, as advisor and possibly as a teacher, with a bank, in the
teaching/training of employees in trustworthiness. Trust is one of my subjects,
so I accepted. The first step was a
skype meeting for an exploration of ideas. We agreed that I would develop a
proposal. In the discussion of that, in a second meeting, I asked whether it
was part of the plan to educate employees to be trustworthy also to customers,
not to sell them opaque products that work out to their disadvantage, as was
customary among banks in the crisis of 2008. ‘Of course’, they answered. ‘But
what if that leads to foregoing opportunities for profit, would that be
accepted by shareholders?’. I received no answer and the meeting was abruptly
ended. I tried to get in the comment that if you are the only bank that can
make good on the promise to such trustworthiness, that might be very
profitable, but it could no longer help.
In the course of the
present series on economics, in this blog, I will argue for a transformation of
economics, with as the most fundamental part replacement of utility ethics by
virtue ethics, where utility still counts, but next to considerations of
moderation and justice. That is needed for justice but also for protection of
the environment, which under the present regime of economics seems
unattainable.
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