282. Policies for combining virtue and freedom
In the foregoing item in this blog I proposed
principles for reconciling freedom of choice of values and views of the good
life with the introduction of morality and virtues in the public domain. I
argued that the liberal stance that markets are value-free is illusory since it
is based on the often hidden choice of utility ethics rather than some other
ethic, and that markets create institutions that affect values and virtues,
such as justice, trust, empathy, and care.
Here I develop those principles into more specific
policies.
First, in education and schooling introduce, or bring
back, a survey, and debate, of different forms of ethics and conceptions of the
good life. Christian ethic of faith, hope and love, utilitarian ethics, Kantian
duty ethics, and Aristotelian virtue ethics. Stoicism, also, perhaps. This is to
serve the development of individual identity as well as good citizenship, with
the interest and ability to debate alternative ethical views and moral systems.
This is to form the basis for a tolerance that is based on interest and understanding
of a variety of values.
Second, against the liberal dogma that they do not
belong to the public sphere, bring back ethical and moral debate in politics
and the formation of policies. What ethical and moral principles are served
with legislation and public endeavours? What freedoms and cultural variety are
allowed? The law must apply equally to all, but tolerance based on mutual interest
and understanding is needed to allow for cultural variety. This is needed,
among other things, to avoid the increasing cultural polarization now taking
place, in Western countries, e.g. with respect to Islamic immigrants.
Then, on the basis of ethical debate, give room for
markets where they work, but limit them where they fail or produce perverse
effects regarding welfare or justice. In addition to existing regulations of
many kinds, change institutions or extend market regulation with measures based
on public ethical and moral debate.
For example, measures should be taken to weaken or
eliminate the pressure of multinational companies on governments to extend
advantages in taxes, regulation, energy prices, etc. with the threat that
otherwise activities will be relocated elsewhere.
For an example of the need for a change of institutions,
consider present efforts of some firms to shift the present purpose focused
only on shareholder interest to wider interests of stakeholders such as
personnel, customers, the environment, and the community. The bottom line is
this: can one afford to be fair and transparent to those stakeholders even when
this
means forgoing opportunities for higher profits. Many
of such ventures are viable only for family businesses or cooperative
businesses, shielded from threats of takeover to exploit the potential for
unethical profits.
As I argued in the preceding item in this blog, mutual
agreement on what is the good life, the ordering of goods, and requisite
virtues, may be viable in smaller and relatively homogeneous communities such
as the Athens of Aristotle, but not in nations as we now have them. But it can
be approached by utilizing present opportunities for decentralization to establish
the smaller scale, localized debate on shared ethics and morality, based on
personal contacts and cooperation in local projects. Those may concern care for
the sick and elderly, for shaping public space, developing public facilities,
local finance for entrepreneurial ventures, sports, cultural events, education,
etc.
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