142. Limits of language
I proposed
that the inclination to think that way derives from evolution, where survival
depended on adequately identifying objects moving in time and space: hunting a
prey, being hunted by the sabre-toothed tiger, aiming and tracing projectiles,
enemies, etc.
Examples of
the bias are the container metaphor (we are ‘in’ love, ‘in’ trouble), the
transmission metaphor (communication as ‘sending signals’ along a
‘communication channel’), ‘putting forth’ an argument, ‘retrieving’ a memory,
etc.
The object
bias concerning the notion of meaning yields the intuition that meaning is
constant as it is shifted from one sentence or context of action to another,
like a chair being moved from room to room. This masks the context-dependence
of meaning.
The object
bias also breeds misleading fundamental intuitions such as being as an object
rather than as a process, the notion of substance as a ‘carrier’ of characteristics,
essence as a defining ingredient. The notion of identity, of a person or
culture, is misleadingly felt to require some essence (see items 8 and 9). The
notion that something must be inside or outside a category, seen as a
container, yields an abhorrence of ambiguity, of being both inside and outside,
or neither. Ambiguity is as frightening as a leaking roof, or doubt whether the
sabre-toothed tiger is inside or outside the cave.
It is a
challenge to expand language and meaning beyond the object bias. In item 36 I
discussed how meanings can be ambiguous, context dependent, and subject to
change, along the hermeneutic circle. In item 105 I recalled
Wittgenstein’s idea of similarity without shared essence, on the basis of family
resemblance.
Montaigne
also was sceptical of the ability of language to grasp objective, outside
reality, and employed language to express what he saw as an inner reality, in
the self-searching of his Essais.
Taoism
also, in its own way, was sceptical of language. One aspect of that is notion
that the cosmos, the all-encompassing whole of natural forces, is ineffable.
That notion of ineffability is familiar also, in the form of an ineffable God,
among mystical streams in Christianity and the Islam. According to Taoism it
also applies to wisdom. Since that transcends ordinary experience with its
misleading linguistic categories, it cannot be entirely or adequately
communicated with words.
From
Coutinho[1]
I learn that Taoism was also aware of what Gilbert Ryle called knowing how vs.
knowing what. Knowing how is also known as tacit knowledge. In
ordinary life it applies to the skill and artistry of an artisan, a motorcycle
mechanic, a painter, or a musician, for example. According to Taoism it also
applies to wisdom. Teaching wisdom, as a way of thinking and living, is largely
by ostentation, with a master showing how, guiding practice in the training of
an apprentice.
Clever
metaphors may help to trigger steps in the groping for insight, skill, and
mastery, as when in master class for violinists the maestro implores the
playing to be ‘more like a mountain stream in spring’. This may help, before we
turn away in despair from the rational incomprehensibility of Taoist writing,
to explain the preaching of silence and the use of baffling, bewildering
metaphors, images and aphorisms in much of it.
[1] Steve Countinho, An
introduction to Daoist philosophies, New York, Columbia University Press, 2014.
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