95. Conditional imperatives
Conditional imperatives say what one should
do to achieve a certain goal. ‘To have success in science one should publish’.
By contrast, categorical imperatives are not oriented towards a goal, such as
the good life (which I discussed in item 39 of this blog). They also neglect
specific conditions of action that might modify or even escape from the
imperative. They claim universal validity.
In item 17 I voiced my criticism of
universal moral rules. Note that in my criticism of universals I did not reject
them. We need universals for logical and empirical inference that we could not
do without, not only in science, but in ordinary life. However, I made a plea
to see universals as preliminary, as stepping stones to step away from in our
cognition. We need them in abstraction, to step away in learning from specific
conditions, but they should again be immersed and enriched in other conditions,
and in the process they shift and change. In item 31 I developed this into a
theory of invention.
The classic case of the categorical
imperative is, of course, the categorical imperative of the philosopher Kant.
It has three forms. One is the old maxim (found also in the bible, and
in Buddhism) that ‘One should not do to others what one does not want done to
oneself ‘. I appreciate the intention of this, and accept it as a principle or
heuristic to guide action, a motive, or in short a maxim, which leaves
room for exceptions. I would not appreciate receiving a ticket for a soccer match
but I would gladly give it to someone who likes soccer.
A second form of the categorical imperative
is ‘To act only according to a maxim that I would also like to be a universal
rule’. Again, I disagree. It is a good maxim not to lie, but under some conditions
lying is humane and wise.
A third form is that ‘I should act such
that I treat mankind, whether another or myself, as a goal, never only as a
means’. Again, I fully endorse this as a maxim. In fact, it comes close to
Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of the other, discussed in item 61, which
inspires me in my proposal of otherhumanism, in item 65. But if a
psychopath attacks my children I would not see or treat him either as a means
or as a goal in himself.
In sum, in my view moral imperatives are
always conditional upon goals, in particular the good life, and conditions. The
contingencies of life are too rich and unforeseeable to be caught in an
unconditional imperative.
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