49. What freedom?

Centuries of philosophical debate on freedom have led to a distinction between different forms or levels of freedom.

First, the freedom of action: in freedom from and freedom to. Freedom from, also called negative freedom, is freedom from external constraint, coercion, intimidation, manipulation, etc. Freedom to, also called positive freedom, is access to resources, competencies, economic, political, social and cultural processes, etc. These freedoms of action differ from freedom of will. Freedom of action may mean that one is at the mercy of unconscious desires, drives, impulses, instincts, addiction, etc.

Hence there are ‘higher’ levels of freedom, concerning the will that lies behind action. A second level of freedom is that of self-reflection and self-restraint. Here one has the internal freedom to ask oneself what one should want on the first level (desires, impulses …) in agreement with a ‘higher’ level of the will. The question then is not ‘what do I want’ but ‘what should I want’. Freedom on this level does not imply that it is good what one wants. One can be convinced that certain bad conduct is good. One can have the self-restraint to do evil. For example, in a violent ideology, for which the fanatic renounces pleasure and comfort.

Freedom of self-reflection and self-restraint are not as self-evident as they may seem. Neural research and social psychology have shown how dominant the unconscious is in our choice and action. Much is determined by unconscious impulse, intuition, instinct, and feelings, and often that yields effective decisions. I discussed this in a previous item (item 5) of this blog, on freedom of the will.

The third level is the freedom for self-perfection, to change what you want that you want, in an adaptation of norms of good and evil. Of course, the question then is where those come from. An important source is Christian morality of self-restraint, altruism, and sacrifice for the weak. The philosopher Nietzsche rejected this with gusto, as hypocritical, a false self-denial, and as a suppression of the forces of life and creativity.

A fourth level is freedom of the self to form the self, in a re-evaluation of values, in a shift of higher (third level) convictions of good and bad. This freedom to transcend and form the self could perhaps be called the freedom of Nietzsche, and earlier it was an ideal of romanticism. Many think that one cannot have this highest level of freedom, or at least not fully, because ultimately everyone is determined by genetic properties, life course, and character that emerges from them. It is like the baron of Munchausen lifting himself from the morass by his bootstraps.

For the formation of the self, escape from the self, freedom from the self, one needs the other who offers opposition and contradiction and thereby offers new insight into what one might want. The good life requires that one grasp this opportunity. And that is different from Nietzsche, who shoves the other aside in the exercise of the will to power.