44. Nationalism old and new

The classic form of nationalism is the romantic nationalism that arose from the end of the 18^th century, especially, at first, in Germany. It was a reaction upon the rationalism and universalism of the Enlightenment, in a re-conquest of feeling over rationality, the particular over the general, myth over science. It sought an escape from the separation that Kant had produced between the self and unknowable reality, by being absorbed in a larger, organic cultural whole, under the wings of a national spirit (see the discussion of romanticism in item 22 of this blog).

In economically less developed societies, the cultural identity of people was largely a matter of family and clan. Societies were strongly hierarchical, and perspectives were determined by birth and descent. That has largely, though not entirely, disappeared.

Charles Taylor claims that in modern society democracy requires a more categorial identity (see the discussion of identity in item 9 of this blog) in which many take part, and to which one belongs by virtue of birth into a national culture.

However, modern society has developed many partly overlapping, partly separated networks, beyond family, in education, profession, sport, work, industry, politics, etc. Access to resources, including employment, reputation, and influence, depends on what networks one takes part in, and the position in them. And those networks have become increasingly international.

Networks generate a novel inequality that is more surreptitious than former rank and standing because it is informal and often denied. Thus there are networks of top managers that sit on each other’s boards, of interest groups that are involved in the making of public policy, and all manner of advisory and supervisory councils.

Access and position in networks highly depends on education and connections, still, that one was born into. Membership of networks is self-reinforcing via overlaps between networks, and the fact that having many connections one becomes an attractive partner for even more connections.

People with a lower level of education, less access to networks and lesser ability to handle them feel left out, robbed of the perspective that democracy promised of direct and equal access, and become disappointed in democracy. They then fall back on national identity as a form of identity to which they do have access, directly and automatically, as a member of the nation. That access is especially connected with language, and that is why language is so central in discussions on integration. Language as access to national identity also forms an easy means for excluding outsiders.

Nationalistic populists can mobilize the grudges and suspicion concerning elites and project themselves as champions of the neglected. For this they can employ nationalistic elements such as language, culture, ethnicity, or religion. They can appeal to human instinct towards mistrust of outsiders. That is especially effective with the claim that foreigners penetrate the networks that the neglected still do have, in family, neighborhood and work. Then identity is seen as identification with national cultural values, and thus the individual becomes subordinate to the nation, and nationalism can become totalitarian, again.