26. Pragmatism

Descartes began with radical doubt to arrive at the indubitable ‘I think therefore I am’. But there are many other things we cannot doubt. Nor can we prove everything. Between doubt and proof lies belief that we are prepared to act upon. Beliefs are temporary and fallible, but we adapt or transform them as we gain further experience, in the practice of our doing. That is the insight from American pragmatism, in the work of C.S. Peirce, Dewey, William James and G.H. Mead. The idea goes back further, to David Hume and the practical wisdom of Aristotle.

Pragmatism is a theory of meaning, knowledge and truth. The meaning of a word or expression lies in its implications for phenomena or actions. A proposition is meaningful if it explains: if something could not have happened unless the proposition is true. Once, it was meaningful to claim that God must exist as designer and creator, because it was otherwise inconceivable how complex forms of life could have arisen. Now, from evolution, we have an alternative explanation.    

But how about a priori truths of logic and mathematics, then? Do they have implications for practical conduct? As the philosopher C.I. Lewis argued: yes and no. Internally, in deduction from a set of axioms or assumptions, truth is formal, ruled by the principle of non-contradiction. Deductions are valid given the assumptions. However, different systems of logic and math are judged by their contribution in constructing theories that help in our practical conduct.

Concerning truth, somewhat misleadingly pragmatism has been attributed the view that something is true if it useful or satisfactory. That was more or less the standpoint of William James, but not of Peirce and Dewey. It is nonsense. Lies often work well but are nevertheless lies. Delusions can be satisfactory. However, truth is still meaningful as warranted assertability: we have good reasons for a belief, on the basis of its fruitfulness, its contribution to solving problems, and the ability to maintain it in critical debate. The warrant may be direct, in its contribution to practice, but also indirect, in its coherence with a system of thought that contributes to practical conduct.

In contrast with philosophical rationalism, the warrant of truth is taken from experience, but not the immediate, uninterpreted sense data of empiricism, but experience as mediated by cognition and sense making. Experience is not atomistic sense data but coherent, purposeful ‘things going on, things being done’.

Concerning knowledge, pragmatism is oriented towards action, and opposes the ‘spectator theory’ of knowledge as contemplation of eternal, immutable truths. It has emphasized problems and their solution: situations where an existing idea turns out not to work or not to fit and needs to be adapted or replaced. I add, however, that another source of new ideas lies in new opportunities:  the idea does fit but alternative ideas turn out to also fit while being more fruitful, providing an opportunity for novel combinations with ideas one had.

I thank John Groenewegen for his comments on a previous version.