515  Looking and having regard

 Some post-modern writers (Merleau-Ponty, Levinas) are wary of looking, seeing,  because that puts things into pigeonholes of pre-established categories, robbing them of their flight, and disregarding the invisible in the thing, its backgrounds and what lies beyond the horizon. This is the look of Medusa, turning the other into stone. Yet, those writers cannot reject seeing, because Levinas, for example, sanctifies looking at the ‘visage’ of the other person, who clamours for recognition of his/her alterity and merits unconditional care and dedication. Thus, there needs to be a different kind of seeing. In French, the word ‘regarder’ means not only looking but also having regard for someone, and that can be included in English as well. This other way of seeing preceeds reason, logic, knowledge, and identity, is visceral. Levinas speaks of a ‘trace’. Of what?

 I ascribe the other-directedness, empathy, openness of the self to the other, to an instinct, developed in evolution. In the 400.000 years of human evolution, largely as hunter-gatherers, humans needed to collaborate, in hunting big game and defense, and for this they needed to imagine the view from the position of the other, originally perhaps dedicated to some specific project, but developed into a general sense of empathy towards others. True, this coincided with a rival instinct for individual survival, defending one’s resources.

 Like other features derived from evolution, this is a potential, which may or may not be realised in life. It may be smothered in mistreatment during infancy, or harshness in the struggle for surival. It is appropriately called a ‘trace’, an unconscious trace from evolution.

 Other such traces from evolution are the subconscious decision heuristics revealed in social psychology (Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky , 1979; Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky (eds), 1982). Our choices are ruled by non-reflective decision heuristics, bypassing rational reflection and calculation. While they are non-rational, they can be adaptive, assisting survival. One is loss aversion: we make greater efforts to avoid the loss of what we have than to acquire things we do not have. This can lead to irrational, fruitless litigation to defend against loss. This is adaptive in that in evolution loss often was loss of life or livelihood. A second heuristic is statistically unwarranted generalisation, raising incidents to the level of law-like regularities. Mishaps or incidental misconduct is seen as ‘always’ happening. This is adaptive in being alert to the possible recurrence of opportunities warranting engagement, and vulnerability to recurrent threat. Another is escalation of commitment, where past losses of a line of action give a motivation to stick to it. This is not rational because bygones are bygones, water under the bridge, and rationally only future costs and benefits matter. Thus, loss of the lives of soldiers prods continuation of the war, because otherwise those losses ‘would be in vain’. It is done in spite of its non-rationality, for reasons of reputation, because withdrawal would signal an admission of having made a bad decision. However, it can also be an indication of perseverance in the face of setbacks. Another is anchoring and adjustment, where people stick to established practices, or allow only for marginal adjustmemt, even though what is established is arbitrary or counterproductive, requiring a new approach. Yet, this also may be adaptive as perseverance.

 The evolutionary, instinctive trace can perhaps contribute to a resolution af a dilemma that Levinas faces, and which he admits, concerning on the one hand the unique individual whose visage commands unconditional care, and on the other hand justice, which applies equally to all, bringing humanity together, in a categorisation, equalisation that Levinas tries to avoid. Charity towards the single other must make a transition to justice in society, with rules that are universal and impersonal (e.g. Levinas 1991b, pp. 113–15). There I must also feel responsible for third parties and ask myself whether the single other does not damage the other others. The asymmetry of the ideal relation disappears and reciprocity and equality under the law appear. The Levinassian relation to the other must be maintained as a source of inspiration and a standard for social justice. How can we ensure that law and justice, with all the institutions and power holders associated with them, remain inspired by the responsibility of the self for every suffering of the unique other? According to Levinas it is a task for ‘”prophetic voices” one sometimes hears to remind the powerful, in the cries that rise from the folds of politics that, independently from official institutions, defend human rights, sometimes in the songs of poets; sometimes simply in the press and in the public spaces of liberal states’ (Levinas 1991b, p. 203). That is not strong enough. I think that the face of the other triggers the evolutionary, instinctive trace of altruism, as a universal.

Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), ‘Prospect theory: an analysis of decision making under risk’, Econometrica, 47.: 263–91.   Kahneman, D., P. Slovic and A. Tversky (eds) (1982), Judgment under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press