119. Moral animals?

 Frans de Waal published studies on moral behaviour, in particular altruism, among apes. They turn out to frequently support each other, even if it yields no advantage or indeed goes against it, and also when they are not kin. 

 A Dutch commentator, Chris Rutenfrans, criticized the claim of morality among apes on the grounds that morality entails a philosophy and a debate on ethics, which animals cannot have[1]. It would be preposterous to suggest that de Waal entertained the thought that animals do have that. But more importantly, the comment misses the point of de Waal’s studies. Moral behaviour does not necessarily require a moral theory or religion. It could be instinctive.

 It has long been thought that humans do not have an instinct for altruism

because that would not have survived in evolution. Egotism or self-interestedness, to
protect one’s interests, would have favoured survival and would hence have been favoured in selection. Altruistic genes would have been muscled out by genes for self-interest. If that were so, then altruism would have to be completely cultural, working against evolutionary pressure towards unmitigated self-interest. Then Rutenfrans would have been correct.

However, more recent evolutionary theory came with an argument why next to self-interest also altruism could have survived. I gave the argument earlier in this blog, in item  46, and I will not repeat it here.

The point of de Waal’s work now is that it shows empirically that altruism arises even among apes, which is important precisely because apes have no moral theory that might have given an alternative explanation, and thus the proclivity towards altruism must somehow be in their genes, and if that is possible then it is possible also in Man.

In other words, while cultural artefacts such as religion may enhance altruism, those are not necessarily the only basis for moral conduct in the form of altruism. To be sure, next to an instinct for altruism the human being also has an instinct for self-interest, to survive in evolution, and any contrary instinct towards altruism would be up against that. When push comes to shove, self-interest will mostly win over altruism. Cultural counterforces would and do help, but de Waals work shows that they may not be indispensable or the only basis.

Rutenfrans also jumps to the conclusion that morality requires a sense of something ‘outside’ and ‘bigger’ than the self, and hence requires a God. Earlier in this blog I argued that while religion indeed is best defined as yielding a sense of something ‘outside’ and ‘bigger’ than the self, that is not necessarily a God. It may be a sense of awe and respect for nature, life and for the other human being. Here, I drew inspiration from Levinas.

A final comment. In my analysis of instinctive altruism, in item 46, I argued that in-group altruism comes at the price of instinctive out-group suspicion. I wonder if that would be found also in studies of apes: less altruism or suspicion or discrimination concerning apes outside the group (allowing for different ways to define that).

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[1] In a review of de Waals recent book, in the Dutch newspaper ‘De Volkskrant’, Saturday 6 July 2013.