79 The cost of
incommensurability
In this blog I have pleaded for an Aristotelian
virtue ethics, according to which there are values in life that have intrinsic
value, in contrast with consequentialist ethics that is focused on consequences,
such as utility (see items 15 and 39). Virtues have no other goals than
themselves, forming a broad notion of happiness. Deeds not only have an
extrinsic, instrumental value but also intrinsic value.
The uppermost
virtue is realization of potential (for Aristotle this was mostly intellectual
potential, but I draw it wider than that). Other virtues are moral courage,
empathy, moderation, prudence, and justice.
Also, again as according to Aristotle,
happiness is not only a feeling or psychological state but lies especially in
action. In human action there is no overarching measure, no guaranteed commensurability,
of what is good; not all good things can be reduced to a single measure such as
pleasure or utility. One cannot add up happiness in love, attending a concert,
sympathy for others, etc. They do not have a common measure by which they can
be traded off against each other, as economists are wont to do, from their
perspective of a utilitarian ethics.
But I grant
that we should not be blind to consequences. Incommensurability carries a
cost. If values cannot be simply traded off against each other, then choices
require debate between different perspectives associated with different values.
In economic parlance, incommensurability yields high transaction costs.
I would prefer to modify that term. The debate is not a matter of transactions
or pure exchange, but of interchange that modifies views and
opinions and aims to cross cognitive distance (see items 57, 58), trying
to bridge differences of view and opinion or recombine them in a new, common
opinion, in some kind of crossover.
So, for
economic reasons we should not assume incommensurability where it is not
strictly needed. In other words, we should try to make trade-offs whenever that
seems warranted.
When it is
not warranted we have to leave it up to debate, to political decision-making.
It is the task of politics to deal with incommensurability. That is why it
should not be left to economists who do not recognize incommensurability. But
then, citizens should also voluntarily put in the effort involved in the
debate. They also should not leave it up to technocrats.
Next, to
take into account specific conditions of individuals, time and place, such
debate often needs to be conducted locally, in communities. That is needed also
for the reason that otherwise the number of people involved would be too large.
In classical Athens the people eligible for participation in the debate were
just small enough to manage, in the public square (agora). In modern
societies the number is too large and the debate must be left, in many cases,
to the usual channelling through political parties. But as much room as
possible should be allowed for debate in local communities. Perhaps
politicians need to be rid of their agoraphobia.
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