544.The
dilemma of benevolence and justice
A prominent writer about self and other was Emmanuel
Levinas (1991). He proposed that the other and the relation with him/her
precedes the ego. ‘The relation is the liberation from the fortification of the ego’ (Lipari, 2004: 129). He deviated
fundamentally from the old idea, going back to Descartes, that the ego, the
subject, has a pre-formed identity, and looks at the world, the object, from
outside. Levinas objected that this turns the other into an object, to be used
as an instrument for the benefit of the
self.
De original meaning of ‘theory’, in ancient
Greek, was ‘seeing’, which yields
‘comprehension’. Levinas is suspicious concerning such seeing and
comprehending, because they press things into pre-conceived moulds of
conceptualisation, neglect what is invisible in the object, its background, its
history and what lies beyond its horizon, its potential for developing.
Nevertheless, Levinas speaks of opening up to the
‘visage’ of the other. It seems to be seeing, but does not pass by the idiosyncracy
of the other that results in its shrivelling. That other seeing of Levinas
precedes rational categorisation.
Levinas calls it a ‘trace’. Perhaps is a good term for the effect of the
instinctive benevolence thrown up in evolution, as proposed by David Hume. That
yields a potential which may not be realised. It can be smothered in adverse
education or harshness in the struggle for life. Levinas himself says he following about it: ‘ it precedes every memory.
It is made in an unrecoverable past, which the present, proposed in memory,
cannot match, in terms of birth or creation (Levin, 1999: 321).
For Levinas the other is ‘high’ by the epiphany of its
face, one must care unconditionally for
him/her, in an asymmetric relation, where the other takes precedence over the
self. The face of the other calls out, which precedes any action, with the
imperative to care for him/her, in full dedication. It is not like opening the
door of one’s house to the other, but letting him/her participate in building
the house. Self and other differ, and cannot merge, and the other must be
accepted and valued in its own identity. The letting the other in is
unconditional. Levinas says that one must accept even one’s hangman.
The evolutionarily given, instinctive nature of the
trace can perhaps contribute to solving the dilemma that Levinas encounters, and admits, concerning
on the one hand the unique individual whose face demands unconditional care,
and on the other hand justice, which applies to all equally, brings humanity
together, in a categorisation, putting in a box, which Levinas wants to avoid.
I call this the ‘dilemma of benevolence’. Benevolence is individual, made to
measure, while justice, requires implies equality under the law. This dilemma
manifests itself widely. Sometimes inequality is required by benevolence. For
example in inequal, progressive taxation, and benefits extended to the indigent
and not to the well-to-do. It comes up in the present quarrel, in the
Netherlands, to reduce the rising price of fuel and energy as a result of the
crisis in Ukraine. Why let higher incomes also benefit from this, rather than
focusing on people who are now in financial crisis?
One cannot craft an arrangement that seamlessly suits
individual taste and at the same time is the same for all. Care for every
single individual person must make the transition to justice for all, with
rules that apply to all and are impersonal. (e.g. Levinas, 1991: 113–15). One must somehow not only feel responsible for that unique other, but also for third parties, and ask oneself
whether the unique other does not harm other others. The asymmetry of the ideal
relationship vanishes, and equality under the law appears. Yet the Levinassian
relation must be preserved as source of inspiration and standard for social
justice. How can we ensure that law and justice, with all its institutions and
power holders, can remain inspired by the responsibility of the self for the
unique other? According to Levinas that is the calling for ‘prophetic voices’
that one hears sometimes, rising from the folds of politics, from the press and
in the public spaces of liberal states
(Levinas, 1991: 203). Is that strong enough?
Levin, D.M. 1999, The philosopher’s gaze; Modernity in the shadows of enlightenment, Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Levinas, E.1991, Entre nous, Essais sur le penser-a-l’autre, Paris: Grasset
Lipari,
L.2004, ‘Listening for the other: ethical implications of the Buber-Levinas
encounter’, Communication Theory, 14/2: 122-41.
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