397. Power, dependence,
control and trust
Economists shy away from discussions of power, because
power should not play a role in supposedly anonymous market forces. Economists do
talk of market power as a disturbance of markets by monopolies, oligopolies and
firms erecting entry barriers to markets. That is to be fought by competition authorities.
But power is more widespread. Power creates dependence. But it can also be
positive. Even monopoly can be beneficial.
I use the (customary) definition of power as having
influence on the choices of others. It can be positive, in an extension of
options for choice, and freedom of choosing from them, or negative, in reducing
them.
If for choice one is dependent upon another, than he/she
has power over you. One can avoid or reduce that by avoiding him/her or by
creating counter-power, by constraining the actions of the other. Trust is
leaving room for conduct for others, control is constraining it. Control can
result in a vicious circle of accumulating mutual constraint. A danger looms of
excessive oversight and control.
What forms and sources of dependence are there? One is
that the other has a unique offer, with few adequate alternatives. That is the
power of monopoly. Or there is no way out, no exit: you are locked in. That is
the power of enforcement. Or there are incentives to submit to power, for the
sake of income, position, protection or prestige.
How to deal with power?
One can fight negative power by constraining the room
for power play, and punishing it by means of contracts, legal coercion.
However, the specification of activities, rights and duties constrains action, and
can act as a straightjacket that inhibits innovation. Contracts are also costly
and may be difficult to enforce, particularly if it is difficult to monitor the
partner’s conduct.
One can also exert direct hierarchical control by
taking over the partner, becoming his/her boss. That is a cop-out: one does not
face the challenge of collaboration between independent partners.
One can also employ a reputation mechanism, where the
partner will not cheat for fear of losing his reputation. Or one can use a
hostage, in the form of some commercially sensitive information one has of the partner, with the
threat, often implicit, not pronounced, to divulge it when the partner
misbehaves. The hostage may also take the form of a package of shares that one
has in the partner’s business that one can sell to someone with the intent of a
hostile take-over of the partner.
There are also more constructive, benevolent ways of
dealing with power.
In relations of collaboration there is the following ‘paradox
of specific investments’. To create unique novelties, in innovation, connecting
each other’s competences, one typically needs ‘specific investments’, dedicated
to the relation, that have no use elsewhere. That makes dependent: if the
relation breaks, the investment is rendered useless. If the investment is
asymmetric, mostly on one side in the relationship, dependence is one-sided. On
the other hand, if the investment makes you special, offering something unique,
that gives countervailing power. A monopoly, in fact. This can generate a race
not to the bottom but to the top: partners keep investing in themselves to
maintain a unique offer.
Another possibility is to demand shared payment and ownership
of the specific investment. Yet another is to make the partner dependent in
some other way, by offering some other unique benefit, such as access to a
market, a brand name, special knowledge, technology, or a patent, or to some
other resource (a lobby, perhaps).
One may also rely on other sources of reliability that
are not oriented towards control, such as trust based on ethics or personal
bonds of friendship, family, clan, or custom.
With the latter, however, one can get caught in
systems of paternalism and enforced loyalty that do not allow for exit, thus
imposing another constraint from power. Obligatory bonds limit the variety and
freedom of outside contacts needed for learning and innovation.
Sometimes there is no alternative to such personal
bonding, as in countries where there is no institutional basis outside personal
relationships, such as a legal system to support contracts, reputation systems,
or a shared ethic and morality. I found that to apply, for example, for
different reasons, to Japan and the Ukraine.
In Japan the reason is a strong tradition of family values,
which is now weakening. In the Ukraine the reason is widespread corruption and
lack of a reliable legal and democratic order and justice.
No comments:
Post a Comment