322. Reference and constitution
In this blog a leading principle is that of
philosophical pragmatism. It can be summarized as follows: the human being
perceives, senses, feels and thinks according to mental processes that guide
actions but are also formed by them, in interaction with its environment,
especially other people.
As a result, the human being is socially constituted.
However, every individual is also unique in its mental construction along its
individual life path.
In other words, to connect with the preceding items in
this blog, the individual is emergent, in its mental construction. Its parts
constitute an identity, as a coherent subject, which is not present in its
parts. And while its path of development is constrained by genetic potential,
its outcome cannot be predicted. It is uncertain as a result of interaction
between self and other. Hence relationships also are emergent.
This presents a major challenge to economic science,
as will be argued in later items.
Here I want to add to previous discussions of meaning
(items 32, 168 in this blog). There I used the distinction between reference
and sense (derived from the work of Frege), but with a twist. Reference is what
an expression refers to. The word ‘cat’ refers to the collection of all cats.
Sense was defined by Frege as ‘The way in which something is given’, the way it
presents itself. I turned that into ‘the way in which we identify’, i.e. how we
identify something as something. How we identify some animal as a cat.
I argued that the latter, sense, is idiosyncratic,
with largely personal connotations attached to the concept, collected along one’s
path of life. We have all had a variety of experiences with different cats. This
connects with the distinction that de Saussure made between ‘langue’, the given
shared understanding of meaning, at any moment, and ‘parole’, idiosyncratic
language use that varies between people and over time.
Here I want to add to that discussion, using an
insight from Jerome Bruner[i], a philosopher who has
been an important source of inspiration in several aspects of my work. The idea
I want to pick up from him here is that in much of our thought and talk we ‘do
not refer to the world but constitute it’. That captures well the idea,
originating with Kant, that we cannot observe the world as it is in itself, but
construe a virtual reality, a rendering of the world and our position in it. That
is how we make sense of the world.
Much of that is not conscious, not a matter of
rational reflection, let alone a testing of hypotheses.
Let’s face it: this constitution of our view of the
world entails prejudice. Among other things, that yields a problem concerning
claims of objective scientific knowledge. That claim lies not in individual objectivity
but in debate between scientists, and is imperfect also there.
It also fits with the idea that the knowing and
sensemaking subject is not an objective, outside onlooker of the world, but
part of it, constituting itself in it. That is found, for example, in
Heidegger’s notion of ‘being in the world’.
So, there is constitution in a double sense. The
individual is constituted by action and interaction in the world, and in the
process it constitutes a representation, a virtual reality of that world. Since
it is done in interaction with others there is some commonality, some shared
sense and understanding, shaped in part by shared language (langue) and other
forms of culture, as well as idiosyncrasy (parole), which yields the variety
that feeds renewal of sense and purpose, both private and public. This is a crucial
thing about humanity and society.
[i] Jerome Bruner, The narrative
construction of reality, Critical
Enquiry, 18/1 (1991), 1-21.
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