288. The politics of virtue
Given the crisis of liberalism, discussed
in the preceding item of this blog, there is a need for a politics of virtue
that looks beyond mere negative freedom, allowing for virtues that open up
positive freedom for the pursuit of the good life. To enable people to develop wider
values and virtues than only those of consumption.
Having negative freedom is ‘being left
alone’: freedom from interference such as coercion, imposition, molestation,
and authoritarianism. However, as recognized by Milbank and Pabst[i],
this fear of interference has led to ‘leaving people alone’ in a wider sense,
with lack of care and concern for others, such as parents offer their children,
in upbringing, teaching and guidance.
Developing potential, enabling for action, judgement,
communication, conflict resolution, moderation, courage, empathy, fairness,
justice, and striving for excellence. Those contribute to positive freedom:
capabilities for a flourishing life, not only being ‘free from’ constraints but
also ‘free to’ develop and exercise talents. They are virtues, traits needed to
achieve a good life.
But all that has come to be seen as
meddling, paternalism, not as enabling but as constraining negative freedom,
even in schools. The choice of a good life and associated virtues are seen as
up to the individual, not to be meddled with at school. But like education in
general, schools should have the task of furthering positive freedom with its
corresponding virtues.
The motive behind the rise of liberalism
was to get rid of religious and political indoctrination and manipulation, but
that has strayed into absence of any concern for values. Separation of state
and church has become separation of state and values.
All this has contributed to the lack of
ability to exercise and absorb criticism, discussed in item 286 of this blog.
Criticism is seen as an affront to autonomy. A public drive against obesity can
be blamed for hurting the self-regard of obese people.
Next, flight from criticism yields
indifference and lack of courage, dressed up as respect for the integrity of
the other. But, I propose, true respect entails interest in another’s contrary
opinions, and the other as worthy of one’s critical attention.
The paragon of negative freedom is the
market: freedom from interference in conducting economic activities, no matter
at what cost of perversities of gluttony, extortion, make-believe, avoidance of
public and environmental responsibilities, commodification of intellectual,
spiritual and cultural values, primacy of efficiency over quality, and only
instrumental rather than also intrinsic value of work and relationships. The
latter violates the ethical principle of treating another as having not only
instrumental but also intrinsic value.
Under the pressure of competition trust
cannot survive and is to left to personal relations of love and friendship, so
economists say.
Deirdre McCloskey has recently argued that
markets have produced bourgeois virtues, the classical virtues of reflection,
courage, temperance and justice, and that those virtues are needed to operate
in markets. Reflection is needed for good business decisions, courage is needed
to take the risk of investment, and temperance and justice are needed not to
antagonize customers. That may be true in the ideal, the utopia of economic
theory, and may have been true in fact in earlier stages of capitalism, but in
present capitalism, dominated by multinationals, not much of that is to be seen
now.
Decisions of top management of
multinationals are often not in the rational interest of the firm, but are motivated
by hubris, self-aggrandizement, and mimicry (e.g. in mergers and acquisitions,
as has been well-documented in research), banks have hived off risks onto the
public, producing the 2008 financial crisis, the drive for salary, bonuses and
conspicuous consumption seems to be without limit, and with power play on
governments special favours have been obtained and laws and regulations are
avoided or bent to achieve more profit.
In sum, the nurturing of virtues for
positive freedom should be brought back as a public endeavour. However, the
challenge is to do so while leaving the choice of a good life up to
individuals, with all their differences in talents and preferences.
As discussed earlier, in items 281 and 282
of this blog, this entails the development of virtues on a meta-level of
striving for mutual understanding and collaboration in the pursuit of what
people variously make of the good life. As discussed, that includes the old
Christian virtues of faith (in the human potential for good), hope (for the
realization of that potential), and love (in reciprocity and an adequate degree
of altruism), as well as the classical cardinal virtues of reflection, courage,
moderation, and justice. Those should be taught and trained, in families,
schools, and organization of work.
[i] John Milbank & Adrian Pabst, The politics of virtue, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016
No comments:
Post a Comment