275. Science and politics: how different are they?
If there is no ultimate, universal, fixed
ground for any science, as argued in preceding items in this blog, does this
mean that there is no great difference between science and politics? Richard
Rorty claimed that: ‘ .. no interesting epistemological differences between the
aims and procedures of scientists and that of politics’[i].
I disagree. To make a long story short, I
would say that the procedure of science is to argue rigorously inside some
language game, while in politics, in a democracy at least, the aim is to
achieve some agreement across a variety of language games, and that cannot be
rigorous and scientific. Ambiguity and shift of meaning is part of the game. It
is more a matter of practical wisdom than of analytical rigor.
Hence the frequent failure of attempts to make
policy making scientific, as happened in the delegation of much economic policy
to economic scientists, for example.
I connect this difference to that made by
Pascal between the ‘ spirit of geometry’ and the ‘spirit of finesse’[ii].
As he formulated it: the spirit of geometry is difficult, at first, since one
has to switch one’s regard away from the complexity, the richness and
variability of the world we are in, in the turn of abstraction. But then it
becomes easy, to argue rigorously, in step with the march of logic or math. The
spirit of finesse, by contrast, is easy, at first, because one keeps looking at
the world in all its complexity, but then it becomes difficult to argue without
error while maintaining that complexity.
In contrast with Descartes, I do not think
that the spirit of geometry has access to rock-bottom foundations of truth in
the form of self-evident ‘distinct ideas’. I do think it helps to clarify
arguments and check their consistency.
Take economics. It uses mathematics but the
virtue of that, in my view, is not that it yields workable models, but that it
allows one to detect errors of argument. But then, to work in application to
policy making one needs to revert to the spirit of finesse.
Politics, more like literature than like science, needs to allow for differences and for shifts in perspective, meanings, assumptions, aims, in what people variously think, value and want.
If pragmatism means ‘anything goes that
works’, then whether and how it is supposed to work is very different between
science and politics.
In science, to work is to be consistent
with established theoretical and methodological assumptions, and with what are
accepted as facts.
In politics, to work, in a democracy, is to
be feasible in the field of political forces and to appeal to a sufficient part
of the electorate. Whether it is logically and factually coherent is of
secondary importance, alas. In politics this may work, not in science. However,
this is no reason not to try to make arguments for policy as consistent and
informed as possible.
An authoritarian regime may impose a single
language game, with aims, conduct, meanings and values settled centrally, and
enforced on all. That is what makes it totalitarian. Some people love it.
It does not thereby become like science. In
contrast with science it is not aimed at truth seeking and openness of conduct
given established method, but at conformance.
[i] Richard Rorty, 1991, Essays
on Heidegger and others, Cambridge University Press, p. 172.
[ii] In his Pensées.
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