261. The truth of Foucault
Foucault tugged at the notion of truth in several
ways. In his earlier work on power embodied in social systems (prisons,
clinics, asylums, ..) he proposed that those constitute ‘regimes of truth’ that
‘make something that does not exist able to become something’, such as notions
of insanity or illness. ‘They are things that do not exist and yet which are
inscribed in reality under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false’. Such
a regime ‘.. is not an illusion, since it is precisely a set of practices,
which established it and thus imperiously marks it out in reality’[i] How, I now ask, are we to
understand things that ‘do not exist yet are inscribed in reality’?
In this blog I proposed the notion that abstract,
theoretical notions, such as madness and illness, and happiness, justice, and
meaning, are subject to an ‘object bias’ (see item 29 of this blog). They are
conceived of like objects in time and space, while in fact in important ways
are not like objects at all. In that sense they are not real, but they are real
in their consequences of being accepted and enacted. Is that how we might
understand ‘inscription in reality’?
In this blog I adopted the notion of truth as
‘warranted assertibility’ (item 104), as supporting argument with warrants of
purported facts, logic, and tested theory.
In his later work, Foucault turned from systems of
power, regimes of truth, to the construction of the subject, the self, that is
entangled in such regimes. He rejects Platonic notions of truth in terms of
contemplating ideal, universal eternal concepts in another world, removed from
the empirical world we live in. He also turns away from truth as identity (x =
y), or as correspondence with something in reality, towards a view of praxis, action in this world, which is a
view of difference and development, not of identity, universality and
constancy. It is not oriented towards another world but to another life in this
one.
That, I propose, is close to the dynamic, pragmatist
stance (items 26, 108), ‘philosophy and imperfection on the move’, that I have taken throughout this blog,
building on the work of the American pragmatist philosophers (Peirce, Dewey,
James), and the practical wisdom of Aristotle.
The classical Greek ‘taking care of the self’ that
Foucault adopted is not aimed at discovery of one’s soul but at the aesthetics
of existence, life as a work of art, plus a truthful accounting for one’s
conduct, in parrhêsia, being truthful. It works with anecdotes, narratives
and exemplars rather than theory and analysis.
Here we have truth not in the epistemological sense,
of an accounting in terms of logic or facts, also not in the sense of warranted
assertibility, but in the sense of talking about a ‘true human being’, or ‘true
hero’, or true ‘love’ or ‘friendship’. It is not the truth of science but of
conduct, not of knowledge but of ethic, in what I called ‘debatable ethics’.
Foucault recognized four dimensions of this truth:
1.
Unhidden, not
absconded, no occlusion, but open, revealed2. Unadulterated, pure. In some places this becomes: independent.
3. Straight, no deviance. In some places this becomes: in accordance with nature
4. Constancy, standfast. In some places this becomes: sovereign.
Perhaps authenticity can be clarified as ‘being true
to oneself’. This, in turn, may be clarified with Foucault’s four dimensions of
such truth: being open, straight, independent, and sovereign.
According to Foucault, classical Greek cynics (such as
Diogenes) take this, and their truth telling, to extremes. Openness, disclosure
becomes living out in public spaces, as a vagabond, exhibitionist, in squalor.
Life is reduced to pure, elementary nature. Conduct is uncultured, primary,
direct, without shame, confrontational, militant. The cynic is staunchly
independent, sovereign, uncompromising. All this is in the service of holding
up unadulterated truths to people, exposing their laziness, materialism,
gluttony, hypocrisy, artificiality, slavery, bondage, …
What to think of all his? I think it is overly
pretentious, and counter-productive in part.
1.
Disclosure
presupposes self-knowledge and transparency, while in fact much is hidden in
our subconscious.2. Independence and sovereignty are an illusion: we need others to constitute ourselves. We need their opposition to mend our prejudices and to attain some freedom from them
3. We rarely go straight, but amble around in improvisation, bumping into errors and novel opportunities and then changing direction.
So, while the ideals of this truth are commendable,
normatively laudable, worth striving for, they are hardly realistic and harbour
a risk of hubris and self-delusion. My objections are the same as the ones I
had against Nietzsche (item 60), in the illusion of developing oneself as a
subject by oneself, overcoming oneself, like the baron of Munchausen pulling
himself out of the swamp by his bootstraps.
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