The notion of alienation is best known from the work of Marx. It mostly
has a negative connotation of not being able to express and be oneself, and to
be accepted, in work or communication. This has three elements.
First, not getting the opportunity to express oneself. Second, not being
heard or understood. Third, not being accepted for what one claims to be.
Concerning the third, whatever one claims to be, to deserve in position
and recognition, is to be ratified by whatever categories apply in the
established ‘symbolic order’ (to use that term from Lacan and Zizek). One may
claim to be a philosopher but this is recognized only when one has a degree in
that field or publications that have been well received professionally or by
the wider public. Zizek called such lack of recognition and legitimation a
‘second death’, a symbolic death, next to physical death of the body.
Here, alienation is that ‘I am not perceived or credited to be what I
feel I am’. On one extreme, as an outsider one may hardly be recognised at all,
hardly have symbolic presence. On another extreme, as a celebrity one may have
too much symbolic presence, distorting what I feel I am.
However, perfect expression, being fully and faithfully present in the
symbolic order, could apply only if one assumes that there is a given,
coherent, unified, original self to be expressed.
In philosophy since David Hume, later also in Marx, and in postmodern
philosophy, that notion of the subject is waived. The subject is seen as
multiple, often incoherent, sometimes even inconsistent, and in flux. It is
constituted by action and communicative interaction, from response from others.
Thus imperfection of expression is inherently problematic because there is no
autonomous self to express. Nevertheless, imperfect expression is still a cause
of feeling forlorn.
Alienation, not being fully understood and accepted, is the price one
pays for having an identity. One cannot have an identity without some degree of
difference or distance to others.
Alienation is also inherent in the constitution of the self. This was
recognized by Marx, and is called ‘constitutive alienation’. As I have argued in
this blog, one needs opposition from the other to develop a self, to have any
chance of correcting one’s myopia and prejudice, to gain freedom from it. Imperfect
expression may call forth correction or enrichment by the response from others.
It then becomes imperfection on the move, in the ongoing making of the self.
In preceding items in this blog I discussed Alfred Hirschman’s notions
of ‘voice’, ‘exit’ and ‘loyalty’. Voice is needed to maintain and repair
relationships when they run into trouble, as they mostly do, rather than
fleeing from them, in exit. In the present analysis, voice assumes a deeper
value, as constitutive of the self.
Then, the issue is not so much an issue of autonomy, the opportunity to
express a given self, but of automorphism, the opportunity to form the self.
Of course, this requires attention from others, not just to listen to
what one has to say, but being open to it, even if it sounds eccentric, giving
it the benefit of the doubt, and next also to oppose or correct it, not only
allowing for expression but also yielding impression. One not only needs to
join but also to have a rejoinder. This appears to be increasingly lacking in
large areas of modern work, due to increased flexibilization, as I discussed
earlier, in item 211 of this blog. Perhaps this resembles what Marx called the
‘commodification of work’.
So, by constructive alienation I mean two things: alienation as a basis
for construction of the self, and alienation from the sources of such construction.
If one is robbed of opportunities for the dialectic of expression and
construction one is alienated from construction.
That occurs when after sending a message one receives no evidence that
it has been read, or when there is no response, no rejoinder. This happens
often in communication via the Internet. Sending a message is a bid for
symbolic recognition, and lack of response yields alienation. For lack of
response one is also alienated from the sources of the construction of the
self. Thus, proliferation of messaging
yields proliferation of alienation. We call this the communication