215. Ideology, power and knowledge
Ideology loads actions and knowledge with strongly
held, prejudicial convictions of interest, purpose, and perspective. It used to
be thought that ideology may be avoided, certainly in science, in
disinterested, objective knowledge. That is an illusion, according to Nietzsche
and Foucault, and I agree. Is every knowledge ideology, then? I don’t think so.
Ideology immunizes itself against critical discourse,
blinding itself, deliberately or not. While knowledge is inevitably biased it
can yet be open to debate, pursuing what earlier in this blog (item 104) I
called warranted assertibility, where
one accepts the obligation to substantiate one’s view with arguments and facts,
even though those are never objectively or
‘rock-bottom’ true. So, if there is anything left in the way of a universal
principle of scientific morality, it is that.
Karl Popper laid down the principle that scientists
should seek falsification, not corroboration of theory. Instead of looking out
for facts that confirm, they should look out for ‘forbidden events’ at odds
with the theory.
In fact, in science there is bias, dodging forbidden
events and criticism, posturing, clamour, painting caricatures, ridiculing the
opposition, setting up straw men to flog, in order to draw attention, or to
protect established reputation and authority. So, Nietzsche and Foucault are
right to say that knowledge entails battle, fight for power.
Counter to Popper’s scientific morality, in fact scientists
routinely seek confirmation rather than falsification.
Progress in knowledge is seldom up to an openness of
the individual scientist to criticism or falsification, and more a matter of
battle, in rivalry and competition, in arenas of publication and debate, within
and between disciplines. Scientists try to falsify not their own theories but
those of colleagues.
That may not be so bad, but the process is affected,
indeed shaped, by positions and roles of authority, in editorial teams and
boards, and by dominant styles and practices of research and publication .
Presently, scientific authority derives from one’s
number of citations or publications in highly cited journals, and then gives
access to positions of gatekeeping in editorial positions of journals.
Countries with a large audience, such as the US, yield the advantage of a
larger basis for citation. One gets cited more often as an American. People
gain advantage by investing, diligently and diplomatically, in positions in
networks, building on and citing the work of the ‘top dogs’, the gatekeepers, imitating
their style and acquiring their patronage.
Top dogs serve as role models, and dominant styles get
established. For example, from the US, the norm of producing ‘single-issue’
papers, not ranging too widely, going for incremental, recognizable and easy to
place results, rather than ambitious breakthroughs, and aiming for the
high-impact journals, which often means US journals. In the rat race for
careers Europeans argue that ‘If you can’t beat them, join them’.
Top economic journals select according to the ‘spirit
of geometry’ enshrined in mainstream economics. I once submitted a paper to
such a journal and received the following one line of response: ‘This paper
does not maximize utility subject to constraints, therefore it is not science’.
Here, science
indeed comes perilously close to ideology.
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