208. Parochialism and integration
In their studies of European integration, Liesbet
Hooghe and Gary Marks[i] argued that political
integration is no longer only a functionalist matter of advantages in
efficiency from integration, and distribution of costs and income, but now also
a matter of feelings of national or regional identity, with corresponding
emotions and their political mobilization by populist political parties.
In particular, there is an opposition between the
scale advantages of integration, discussed in the preceding item in this blog,
and the phenomenon of parochial altruism discussed in item 205. The latter contributes
to resistance against erosion of national identities and independence.
This appears to have been part of the Greek crisis.
In parochial altruism, people have an urge to favour
members of their in-group, to the detriment of outsiders. I add that this
appears to be instinctive, and hence largely automatic, unreflected, as an
outcome of evolution.
In addition to this, Hooghe and Marks note, there is
the condition that individual identity is shaped by group identity. For a
discussion of individual and cultural identity, and the relation between the
two, see items 8 and 9 of this blog.
In other words, there is a double effect: in-group
altruism between individuals, and in-group formation of individual identity.
But wait. What in-group are we talking about? People
belong to a variety of groups: of family, friends, profession, work, sports,
community, province, nation, language, and international contacts. Earlier I
claimed that identity is not in the nature of some essence that an individual
harbours, but more a matter of positions in overlapping networks.
So, if in time people are involved in a greater
variety of networks, developing multiple facets of identity, then the obstacle
to integration should weaken. The problem, however, is that there is an increasing
polarization between well-educated, well employed, cosmopolitan elites, which have both more affinity and a better
insight into the functional advantages of integration, and profit more from them, than lesser
employed, lower educated classes of people.
The former have more varied sources of identity, less
locked up in local or national identities, than the latter, and it is the latter
who are mobilized by populist parties.
Hooghe and Marks also note that there is asymmetry in
effects on integration. To the extent that decision making concerning
integration is consensual or majoritarian, one needs only one vote against, or
a minority, to block further integration, and a consensus or large majority to
promote it.
Perhaps it is useful here to also make a connection
with Robert Putnam’s[ii]
notions of bonding vs. bridging social capital (capital in the
form of positions in networks). Bonding capital increases in-group bias and
bridging capital reduces it. But not only is the difference increasing between
elites and lower classes, connections between them are decreasing rather than
increasing, in increased segregation in jobs, schools, recreation, and sports.
Do the Internet and social media produce bridging or
bonding (or both)?
In my discussion of cognitive distance, in this blog I argued that the ability to
understand people who think differently depends on absorptive capacity, ability
to understand and identify with others, and rhetorical ability to help others
in doing so, and that these abilities grow with experience in dealing with
others who think differently.
Hopefully, this will grow in Europe. Cultural and
economic diversity are not necessarily fatal for integration under a single
currency. In India, for example, cultural diversity is larger and mobility
between regions is less than in the EU, and yet it has a successful single
currency.
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