160. History goes on

Francis Fukuyama became famous for his claim of the ‘end of history’. What he meant was that rivalry between political ideologies is over, with capitalist liberal democracy as the only viable ideology left.

This claim has been much criticized. How about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, with the claim of IS (until recently called ISIS) to establish a fundamentalist, extremist caliphate across the Middle East and further.

How about the rise of authoritarian regimes, as in China, Russia, and Turkey, which allow for capitalist markets but not for liberal freedoms?

How about the paralysis of American politics, with the two parties in deadlock of mutual veto?

How about populist rebellion in Western European democracies?

In a recent article[1] Fukuyama recognized these setbacks but reiterated his claim that in spite of them in the end capitalist liberal democracy will necessarily prevail.

Methodologically this is rather weak. In that way one can defend anything that has not yet happened. The second coming of Christ. Divine miracles. Logically one cannot prove that something will never occur.

So what is the argument, and what the evidence? 

Fukuyama claims, plausibly, that IS will not in the long run succeed in its violent destruction of freedom. China, Russia and Turkey will run into the phenomenon that with rising prosperity of the middle classes they will demand freedom, with liberal democracy as the inevitable outcome. That is less self-evident. Middle classes may choose to be bought into loyalty with prosperity and privileges.

Concerning facts, Fukuyama points to revolts against authoritarianism and corruption in Egypt, Ukraine, and Turkey. Yes, but they have all subsided or been sidetracked.

My counterexamples are the street protests in Greece and Spain against the derailment of financial markets and democratic institutions, the protests of the ‘Occupy’ movement, widespread demonstrations against capitalist globalisation.

Those also seem to have subsided, dissolved, suppressed, or sidetracked. Does that prove that they were misguided, and does it confirm the triumph of capitalist liberal democracy? No, not any more than that the subdued protests in authoritarian states prove their superiority.  

I propose that the rise and fall of protests against capitalist liberal democracy demonstrate the ‘system tragedy’ that I have argued earlier in this blog: the inability of a system that has become perverse to reform itself from inside. Criticism from outside the system falters from the paradox, discussed in item 151 of this blog, that people protest against the results of an ideology of individualism that they have learned to endorse and practise themselves. Ideologically, they stand empty handed.

I preceding items in this blog I have argued how deep, how fundamental, philosophically, the crises of capitalist societies are.

What, then, is my answer to Fukuyama’s question what alternative, viable ideology there is, or could be?

In this blog have tried to provide fundamental ideas for that, in a new understanding of equality, individuality, and solidarity (in items 150-152).

Related to that, as an item of practical policy, I advocated the introduction of a Basic Income (154).

Does this amount to a viable and forceful rival ideology? Not yet, surely.

The most fundamental point is a switch from a utilitarian ethics to a virtue ethics, as the basis for a radically different view of markets, with collaboration next to rivalry, with a large measure of reciprocity, and with regard to intrinsic next to extrinsic, purely instrumental utilitarian views of work and enterprise.

That might yield some revised form of capitalist liberal democracy, or some variation upon it, but it would be fundamentally different, perhaps deserving a different name. Let new history begin.        

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[1] Francis Fukuyama, ‘At the end of history still stands democracy’, the Wall Street Journal, 6^th June 2014.

159. System rebellion

Foucault showed how institutions exercise inexorable power (he discussed prisons, hospitals, for example). I discussed this in item 50 of this blog, where I wrote: ‘Foucault showed how cultural systems are internalised, how both those who exert power and those subjected to it may take it as self-evident’.

In item 151 I discussed the work of Rosanvallon, who recalled the paradox of Bossuet: In Western society people complain about the consequences (market failures, increasing inequality of income and wealth, tax evasion, favouritism, lobbying and rule bending by large enterprises) of causes they endorse (individual self-realization, singularity). This explains why in spite of their discontent people don’t rise in revolt. A coherent internal conviction is lacking. 

In item 109 I discussed system tragedy. An example is the recent financial crises. In spite of all the scandals, matters seen to more or less get back to their normal pernicious course. Nested prisoners dilemmas on multiple levels of employees, consumers, banks and governments keep the system locked in.  

The main problem with all these insights is that they may result in resignation, the shedding of all hope of changing the system, and consequent renunciation of any effort. Almost as if there is some supernatural, even divine cause at work.

Williams discussed how in classical Greek tragedy the tragic heroes (Agamemnon, Oedipus, ….) are confronted with little choice in conducting bad deeds, subject to the inexorable power of the gods.[1] Rising against the power of the gods, hubris, is punishable by torture (as for Prometheus, for stealing the fire from the gods).

In Western Europe, the generation 1968 had ideals for change, found no way to realise them from outside the system, allowed themselves to be co-opted in the system, intending to accept the challenge of ‘a march through the institutions’ to effect change. They failed, and with the feeble excuse that they ran up against system tragedy they settled into profiting from it, and became the now much maligned managers and financiers that consolidated the system.

The Occupy movement refused to fall into that trap of becoming embedded and sidetracked in the existing political process, but as a result they locked themselves out from perceived relevance, and apart from symbolic value seem to have no significant, lasting, structural effect on the system, which simply grinds on. They seem to have evaporated.

So what to do now? It is decadent to resign and renounce rebellion, in the same way that responding to nihilism with indifference or hedonism is decadent, as discussed in item 147.

If it is impossible to change the system from within, and soft power of protest from outside has no effect, turns out to have no power, is it is a matter of waiting for revolution to erupt?

Or will the system collapse under the onslaught of rival, more vital ideologies, new or old, that have a more vigorous, consistent and forceful internal conviction, no matter how evil that may be? Is that what we see happening now?

Is the demise of the Enlightenment to be followed by a new dark age?

The only hopeful alternative that I can see is the grasp of new forms of equality, individualism and solidarity that I set out in items 150-154. There is no convincing sign that this will happen any time soon. It probably cannot budge the system. But that is no reason to give up.

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[1] Bernard Williams, 2008 [1993], Shame and necessity, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

 

158. Analytical and continental philosophy

 There is supposed to be a rift between analytical philosophy, with a mostly Anglo-Saxon tradition, and continental philosophy, mostly from continental Europe. What is the difference? Bernard Williams said that analytical philosophy was a matter not of substance but of style:

‘ .. a certain way of going on, which involves argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech’. [1] 

But continental philosophy, like any philosophy, also entails ‘argument and distinctions’. I admit that often it is difficult to read, obscure, not ‘moderately plain speech’, but that also occurs, though indeed less, in analytical philosophy.

So, if the distinction is to be meaningful, it must lie elsewhere.

First, it has to do with a striving for logic, rigour, parsimony and clarity, in analytical philosophy, while continental philosophy explores and often crosses the boundaries of clarity and logic, venturing into ambiguities, which indeed regularly derails into obscurity and rampant verbosity.

Second, related to this, analytical philosophy tends to separate intellectual, analytical activity from practical judgement, and takes pride in conducting only the first.

For example, Semantics, theory of meaning and truth, is seen as separable from, and prior to, pragmatics, practical language use. Discussion about what goodness is, in meta-ethics, is separable from, and prior to, considering what is good, in ethics.

Continental philosophy, but also American pragmatism, turn it around: practical judgement feeds (or should feed) intellect, practice feeds theory, and experience feeds understanding. While it is the job of theory to guide practice, it cannot give closure in regulating it. It gives partial and temporary guidelines, not universal, fixed rules. Pragmatics dominates semantics, and ethical judgement dominates meta-ethics.

Continental philosophy’s ventures beyond limits of meaning, into ambiguity, issue not from neglect but from conviction, steps deemed necessary. Logic and rigour have their limits and it is a task of philosophy to explore them. Exploration of limits, of knowledge and meaning, in ‘transcendental’ philosophy, is a goal of much philosophy. Heidegger is a paragon of such style and effort, but not necessarily the most attractive one.

Third, the term ‘analytical’ indicates that ‘proper’ thought engages in trying to understand wholes by taking them apart into their components, and processes or phenomena by reducing them to one or few basic principles. It is reductionist. Argument has become synonymous with analysis.

Continental philosophy, by contrast, is holistic. The meanings of parts depend on the meaning of the whole, and processes or phenomena can be irreducibly complex and variable. Truth is warranted assertability, and ethics is debatable, depending on context and culture. 

Now, can one combine elements from analytical and continental philosophy?

One can do one’s best to be clear about complexity and ambiguity. One can alternate between analysis and practical judgement. One can combine the notions of the whole being a function of parts with that of parts being a function of the whole. The hermeneutic circle, discussed in item 36 of this blog, does that. The notions of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, taken from analytical (Fregean) philosophy, help understand the hermeneutic circle. 

Wittgenstein is an example. Often seen as an analytical philosopher, in fact he played a crucial role in continental philosophy, to the chagrin of his teacher Bertrand Russell, with ideas comparable to those of Heidegger, as I will discuss in following items in this blog.

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[1] Bernard Williams, Ethics and the limits of philosophy, 2006 [1985], London: Routledge, p. xvi.

157. What is rational?

 Is being rational using reason, calculating optimum utility, giving reasons, or being reasonable?

 Using reason is associated with logic, being consistent, making valid inferences, using argument, seeking truth, and respecting facts.

However, logic does not always have a grip. It builds on assumptions that are not always clear. It takes things for granted that perhaps should not be. Some situations are undecidable. Inconsistencies may be built into options or actions.

Facts are subject to interpretation and may be in dispute. As I argued in this blog, truth cannot be much better than warranted assertability.

Aristotle distinguished between theoretical reason, as in science, and practical reason, as in morality. However, he considered the first to be the highest of a range of virtues, and able to reconcile all virtues in one harmonious whole. I think that good things may be difficult to reconcile, may be incommensurable. 

In utilitarian ethics, as in economics, rationality means the choice of an optimal solution, for an individual or group, given desires and limited means. The underlying assumption is that all ideas, ideals, convictions, and desires are commensurable, can be brought together in a one consistent system of preferences.

Utilitarianism does not do justice to certain convictions. To adopt an example from Bernard Williams: racial discrimination may then be allowed, if it causes only limited damage to a few victims and great satisfaction to a large number of perpetrators. One may also, for reasons of conviction, go against one’s self-interest.

Also, the best choice is not always a good choice. One may have to choose between two bads. As Bernard Williams put it: ‘For utilitarianism tragedy is impossible’[1]

Alternatively, reason is taken as giving reasons, based on the idea is that every act must have a specifiable reason, standing apart from the act, outside it, hovering above it, so to speak. That is foundationalism. As Bernard Williams noted, the fundamental underlying idea is that the goings on of the world must and can be made transparent.[2]

Foundationalism has gradually lost its credibility. The world, and certainly actions, are not always transparent. People do many things for which reasons cannot be specified. Judgements are based on assumptions that are often tacit, or taken for granted, and an outcome of one’s socialization into a culture. Often, as Wittgenstein said, we cannot give better reasons that ‘That is just how it is done’.

That does not mean that one cannot give reasons, but they are to be accepted as partial, tentative, and subject to revision. The crux of rationality then lies in debate, putting reasons up for discussion, not in indubitable foundations. That is reason as being reasonable.

Look around in the world. People indulge in blind ideologies and murder each other for it. This is fed by two things. First, the delusion that since values and views must be universal, only one’s own are valid and the rest are to be annihilated. Second, surrender to emotion, to the neglect of argument and facts.

Philosophy had to learn that the ideal of simple, abstract, universal and fixed foundations, to regulate thought and action, is not viable and human, is even authoritarian, imperialistic. It cannot cover life, society and humanity in all its complexity, variety and variability. What remains is practical reason, being reasonable, willing to give reasons, debate, listen, be open to opposition, and be as truthful as possible. We now seem to need that more than ever.

Giving reasons when possible, putting them up for discussion, trying to be logical and consistent, respecting facts whenever available, choosing an optimal solution when it does not violate ethical principles and is not otherwise hampered by incommensurability, and empathy for the other while keeping an eye on one’s self-interest.

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[1] Bernard Williams, Morality; An introduction to ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1993[1972], p. 86.

[2] Bernard Wiiliams, Ethics and the limits of philosophy, London: Routledge, 2011[198], p.112.