146. Meaning nihilism
Wittgenstein
(in his later work) and Heidegger proposed that in our cognition and language
ideas and words have meaning not as individual, isolated entities, but only
holistically, as a coherent system associated with a body of practice and
discourse.[1]
Wittgenstein
called those constellations ‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’. Heidegger
called it ‘Being’ as acting in the world. Knowledge, language and practical
conduct are not grounded in abstract, absolute, objective, basic notions and
logic. It is the other way around: practice is primary and abstractions follow.
Understanding is not contemplation of truths but ability to perform a practice.
Mostly, we do not rationally develop and justify beliefs before we adopt them
but take them for granted as we adopt them.
One absurd
consequence of predetermined meanings would be that all future uses are
enfolded in the beginning, which is equivalent to saying that there can be no
future. Meanings change along with the practices in which they arise.
We are
socialized and cognitively formed in practices that are taken for granted and
form our terms of reference, which have no outside foundation and we cannot
step out of. We can only point to established practice, in some community or
context. There is no ultimate justification. Rationalization remains internal
to the practice, delving from within the terms in which the justification
is made. At some point all we can say is ‘this is how it is done’. Notions of
right and wrong can arise only within, not between language games. One can say
in chess that a certain move is illegitimate, but one cannot say that chess is
wrong.
This
response to semantic nihilism yields the same cultural relativism as Richard
Rorty’s response to nihilism more widely, discussed in the preceding item in
this blog: judgement of legitimacy operates only within cultures.
This is
reminiscent of a famous debate in the philosophy of science, with Thomas Kuhn’s
notion of incommensurability between different paradigms.
As before,
in the preceding item this blog, my problem with this is that if all attempts
at debate across language games, paradigms or cultures are renounced as
hopeless, the result is either mutual indifference and isolation or a settling
of differences by power and violence. That would eliminate the potential of
variety for intellectual and spiritual growth, and it would entail surrender to
war and conflict.
While I
admit that differences can be so fundamental as to preclude any meaningful
debate, I think that most of the time some commonality can be found, in some
similarity of experience, from which with clever metaphors some bridges of
understanding can be built.
Earlier in
this blog (in items 57, 58, and 66) I discussed this in terms of cognitive
distance and attempts to bridge it. I discussed meaning and its
change in items 37, 36, and 37.
[1] Cf. Lee Braver, 2012, Groundless grounds; A study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, MIT press.
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