I largely
disagree with Wittgensteins early work (of the Tractatus
logico-philosophicus), while I largely agree with his later work (of the Philosophical
investigations) that on some points constitutes a 180 degree turn from his
early philosophy, and which for me has formed a great source of inspiration.
I agree
with the early Wittgenstein that we fool ourselves with language. This is the
case not only in philosophy, but more widely, in talk of abstract entities such
as knowledge, happiness, meaning, etc. In particular, as I argued in item 29 of
this blog, we suffer from an object bias, treating abstract notions as
if they were objects in time and space. The properties of such objects
are used for metaphors to deal with abstractions, and thereby they mislead us.
Here I make use of the work of Lakoff and Johnson. This cognitive bias,
embodied in language, is inherited from our evolution, so I argue.
I disagree
with the early Wittgenstein’s famous dictum that ‘Of which we cannot speak one must
remain silent’. As I argued in item 103, it is the job of philosophy to speak
of things that go beyond scientific and everyday understanding, notions and
meanings, which by definition are difficult to talk about but nevertheless
insistently knock on the door of our thought.
In line
with my pragmatist philosophy, set out in this blog, I agree with the later
Wittgenstein’s notion of words as ‘tools’, where meaning is pragmatic,
depending on the use to which they are put, in meaning as use. Words may
develop new meanings in the way that a screwdriver might be used as a hammer. I
discussed this in the items on meaning (nrs. 32-37).
I try to
connect Wittgenstein’s views on meaning with established theory of meaning,
derived from Frege, with the distinction between what words refer to (extension,
reference) and how this reference is established (intension, sense).
We determine reference and truth on the basis of associations in thought,
connected to words, that constitute sense, which we develop as we put words to
practice, along the line of our life. This private sense may yield a shift of
public reference, and hence ‘truth’, along a hermeneutic circle.
Universals are to be seen as imperfect and temporary, in imperfection on the
move. This has important ethical implications, in lifting the suppressive,
regimenting weight of universals and giving more room for individuality.
Related to
this I like Wittgenstein’s notion of language games with rules for using
words, established in conversations and embedded in culture, in tacit habit.
I also like
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, where entities can resemble
each other without having some shared essence. I think this also has ethical
implications. People can have affinity or similarity without some shared
cultural, ethnic or national essence. Identities can be plural. This may yield
an antidote to nationalistic intolerance.
While in
his earlier thought Wittgenstein used logic to show up the delusions of
language, in his later thought he appreciated words as forms of life
that are richer than logic. Language constitutes a category on its own.
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