104 Truth as argumentation
The philosopher Kant made a distinction
between the realm of knowledge and truth concerning the world and the realm of
ethics. This corresponds with the distinction between causes, which operate in
the world, and reasons, which belong to ethics. As part of the physical world,
the self is constituted by causes, as part of the ethical world by
reasons.
This brings Kant into great problems. One
problem concerns the issue of free will, which I discussed in item 5 of this
blog, and I will not repeat my position here. In viewing the self as part of
the world Kant sees its actions as governed deterministically by causes (in the
brain). In the view of the self as a moral agent, however, the self (the transcendental
subject) is free and fully responsible for its actions. This separation of
realms, I think, is not very helpful, and I don’t see how it can be tenable.
According to Kant, and I agree, in our
knowledge of the world there can be no certainty in any correspondence
theory of truth, according to which elements of knowledge, either
rationalist Cartesian a-priori ideas, or empiricist elementary sense
data correspond, somehow, with elements of reality. We cannot know the
world as it is in itself, or rather, we cannot know whether or in what
way we do. We cannot do other than apply categories that are part of
language and cognition, right or wrong, to form perception and understanding.
In item 28 I adopted an evolutionary perspective.
There I accept that reality exists even if we cannot objectively know it. Then
there is realism in our conceptualization of objects and agents in time and
space: If it were not in some sense adequate to reality we would not have
survived in evolution.
According to Kant, in the ethical realm,
outside the realm of causality in the world, we can achieve certainty,
in rational ethical judgement, as in the categorical imperative. Earlier
in this blog, in items 17 and 95, I accepted that imperative as a guideline,
but subject to conditions, not as an absolute universal.
In my discussion of forms of truth (item
25) and pragmatism (item 26) I proposed to use the notion of truth as warranted
assertability. This is wider than pragmatism in its traditional form: an
assertion is adequate if it ‘works’ in practical application including debate, i.e. stands up to
logic and facts.
I now propose that it applies to both
knowledge of the world and ethics. We can never be sure about either. I add
that while the distinction between causes and reasons makes sense, in our
cognition reasons are causes that we are aware of, in contrast with drives that
operate outside our consciousness.
In knowledge of the world the warrant for
assertions lies in both logic (and mathematics) and empirical observations.
With Kant I accept that observations are constituted cognitively, so that facts
are theory laden. However, they still form a basis, albeit not an
absolute and sometimes a somewhat shaky one, in that facts are more
intersubjectively and temporally stable than the theories they are used for to
test. Warranted assertability is never certain and always provisional, as
pragmatism claims.
Morality is based on warranted
assertability in arguments concerning the good life and ways to promote it. I
can say this because I follow Aristotelian virtue ethics, not Kant’s
rationalistic, universalistic, deontological duty ethics.
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